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OYEZ, OYEZ: AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS 
Judge Mary A. Celeste† 
“I, Mary Celeste, do solemnly swear that I will support the 
Constitution and the Laws of the State of Colorado and the City 
and County of Denver and faithfully perform my duties of the 
Office of Judge for Denver County Court.” At age forty-nine, I had 
become a judge. I was slated to be a straight suburban housewife, 
but I was now instead the first out and open LGBT judge in 
Colorado and the Rocky Mountain Region. I went from being a 
housewife, to a single lesbian mother, to an attorney, to an LGBT 
activist, to an LGBT leader involved in the United States Supreme 
Court case, Romer v. Evans.1 As a judge, I would leave behind my 
LGBT activism, but my experience with the Romer case would stay 
with me forever. 
 
        †   Judge Mary A. Celeste currently sits on the Denver County Court bench 
where she was the presiding judge in 2009 and 2010. Judge Celeste was the first 
woman and out LGBT person to hold that position in the history of that court. 
She was also the first out LGBT judge in Colorado. She sat on the Colorado 
Advisory Committee for the United States Civil Rights Commission and is 
currently a NHTSA Judicial Outreach Liaison for Region 8. She has served as the 
president of the Colorado Women’s Bar Association Foundation; the president of 
the American Judges Association, where she was the first LGBT judge to hold that 
position; a board member and former education co-chair of the International 
Association of LGBT Judges; and an adjunct professor at the Sturm College of 
Law. She served as a board member of the LGBT Community Center, the 
Colorado Bar Association’s Board of Governors, the Colorado Women’s Bar 
Association Board of Governors, and the LGBT Victory Fund, where she also 
served as the Political Committee Chair. She is the cofounder of the Colorado 
Legal Initiatives Project, the nonprofit organization that spearheaded Colorado’s 
campaign against Amendment 2, which resulted in the United States Supreme 
Court case of Romer v. Evans; the Colorado LGBT Bar Association; and the 
Colorado LGBT Chamber of Commerce. She is a pre-eminent national speaker on 
the topics of drugged driving, and marijuana and the law. This article is a 
modification of a chapter in her forthcoming book entitled MY LIFE IN LAVENDER. 
Kellie Lee Gibbs has contributed to this piece. 
 1.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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2015] AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS 45 
Amendment 2 was a Colorado statewide initiative to amend 
the state constitution in an attempt to eradicate all existing citywide 
protections for LGBTs across the state. It was brought by a religious 
right organization called Colorado for Family Values (CFV) on the 
heels of their loss at the voting booths in Denver. CFV wanted to 
overturn a Denver LGBT protective ordinance. In essence, 
Amendment 2 stated that every entity in the state was barred from 
enacting, adopting, or enforcing any laws that protected LGBTs. 
LGBTs would be barred from bringing any claims of 
discrimination. The language of the amendment was fairly simple, 
but its potential impact was enormous. In full, it read: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or 
Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado 
through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its 
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school 
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, 
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, 
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim 
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status, 
or claim of discrimination. This section of the constitution 
shall be in all respects self-executing.2 
In Romer, Amendment 2 was challenged all the way to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
The holding in that case became one of the most important 
LGBT Supreme Court cases and would lay the legal foundation for 
overturning the nation’s sodomy laws and pave the way for the 
legalization of LGBT marriages. Romer also established the equal 
protection argument against the newly developing “religious 
freedom laws,”3 which, if passed, would allow individuals or 
 
 2.  Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338–39 (Colo. 1994). 
 3.  See, e.g., S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (“State Action 
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability.”); H.R. 427, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Idaho 2014) (“Free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that applies in this 
state, even if laws, rules or other governmental actions are facially neutral.”); H.R. 
2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014) (“[N]o individual or religious entity shall 
be required . . . to . . . provide any services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges . . . related to the celebration of[] any marriage, domestic 
partnership, civil union or similar arrangement; . . . solemnize any marriage, 
2
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46 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
businesses to turn away LGBT clients as long as they cite religious 
objections to homosexuality.4 
The case began in 1992 and ended in 1996. It wound its way 
from the state court, which halted the implementation of 
Amendment 2 by granting an injunction; to the Colorado Supreme 
Court, which affirmed the lower court decision; to its final 
destination at the United States Supreme Court.5 In 1991, five years 
before Romer reached the Supreme Court, I, along with other 
LGBT activists, formed the Colorado Legal Initiatives Project 
(CLIP) to prepare a legal challenge in the event that Amendment 2 
became law.6 We selected the plaintiffs and the attorneys for the 
potential case far in advance of election night. Although the 
pundits and the polling seemed to indicate that this initiative would 
fail, I felt too nervous to idly stand by and watch. In consultation 
with the anti-Amendment 2 campaign manager, Judy Harrington, 
and many members of the newly formed Mayor Webb’s LGBT 
Committee, we were ready to stop the implementation of 
Amendment 2 dead in its tracks. 
We agreed that the legal challenge would be homegrown. I 
personally solicited former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Jean 
Dubofsky as our lead counsel—what a coup! National organizations 
such as Lambda Legal and the ACLU, local and national, would 
come aboard swiftly, but the case belonged to Coloradoans. We 
were “ground zero” along with Oregon, which was facing a similar 
discriminatory initiative. The political environment for LGBTs in 
Colorado during these five years was very difficult. CFV had been 
collecting money from all over the nation and disseminating 
hateful pamphlets about the LGBT “lifestyle.” 
 
domestic partnership, civil union or similar arrangement; or treat any . . . as 
valid.”). A corollary religious argument was demonstrated in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–62 (2014), which addressed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act as opposed to a First Amendment religious freedom 
argument. 
 4.  See, e.g., Kan. H.R. 2453. 
 5.  Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 
14, 1993), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 6.  CLIP was formed for the sole purpose of preparing a legal challenge to 
Amendment 2. The organization selected the attorneys and plaintiffs, and funded 
the expenses for the suit. CLIP also served to coordinate all of the local and 
national organizations that participated in the action, including Lambda Legal, 
ACLU Gay Rights Project, and Colorado’s ACLU. Currently, CLIP serves as the 
legal arm of the Colorado LGBT Community Center. 
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2015] AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS 47 
CFV was also cloning and exporting the initiative to other 
states for use in their next election cycles. Some LGBTs countered 
by calling for a boycott of Colorado, which caught fire quickly. 
Colorado was deemed the “hate state,” and organizations and 
celebrities alike honored the boycott. The boycott affected 
Colorado tourism and, needless to say, caught the attention of the 
business community. Many people came forward with remedies and 
substitutions, none of which gained any momentum. The media 
was laden with television pundits and commentators, and the 
newspapers had stories and editorials commenting on the legalities 
and illegalities of Amendment 2. All eyes were focused on 
Colorado. When we finally got to the United States Supreme Court, 
based upon my work and involvement, I was able to secure a 
ringside seat at the oral arguments. 
As I waited outside the Court, crowds of people from Colorado 
and all over the country lined up to witness the case. I read to 
myself the main inscription on the front architrave high above the 
main doors: “Equal Justice Under Law.” Would we find that here 
today? Into the courtroom we moved, and I was seated immediately 
behind our lead attorneys. Suddenly a hush fell across the 
courtroom and entering from behind a flowing red curtain was a 
poised and proper man in long coattails. Directing people to their 
seats, the bailiff looked as though he belonged in England. Maybe 
the Justices would arrive in white powdered wigs. I smiled nervously 
to myself. Jean Dubofsky, Jeanne Winer,7 and Rick Hills,8 our team, 
entered and sat at their table. Colorado Solicitor General Tim 
Tymkovich and Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton sat at the 
opposing table directly in front of me. The way I saw it, the warriors 
had arrived and were prepared for battle. The power of truth 
would be revealed this morning—all that was left to do was express 
it convincingly. 
I watched the tall bailiff gracefully maneuver about the large 
chamber. It was his job to ensure that the court session proceeded 
smoothly and timely. He held his back erect and his shoulders 
square, with his styled strands of hair pulled up and over a balding 
head. Clearing his throat slightly, the bailiff stood tall as he opened 
his mouth, “Oyez! Oyez!” He called out the simple words that 
snapped the entire room to order. After the room calmed, he 
 
 7.   Jeanne Winer is a lesbian attorney from Boulder, Colorado. 
 8.   Rick Hills was Jean Dubofsky’s assistant. 
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called the first case. An expectant quiet rippled through the court. 
Smoothly clicking his feet to one side, the bailiff announced the 
nine Court Justices. Entering almost simultaneously, they rounded 
the heavy curtains that hung behind their massive chairs and sat 
down: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. 
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Stephen G. Breyer, 
and David H. Souter. 
The way they flowed from behind the curtain openings 
reminded me of the Johnny Carson Show: Heeere’s the United States 
Supreme Court! I shook off the nervous parody. Standing up 
respectfully straight, I released a quiet sigh. In all honesty, I had 
expected to feel daunted by the presence of the Justices but 
realized instead how very human they were. As I glanced from face 
to face, my heart began racing—would they understand? I shifted 
uncomfortably in my seat. Would they grasp the true content of our 
arguments? Would they get it? Would they see how discriminatory 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 was? They were certainly smart enough, 
but would their political leanings influence them in the wrong 
direction? 
My colleagues and I had spent the weekend trying to figure 
out which way each Justice would go, what types of questions they 
would ask, and whether or not the arguments they needed to hear 
would actually be allowed. Did they get the fact that gays and 
lesbians are a marginalized group of people? It was common 
knowledge that the Justices, with the help of their legal clerks, had 
read and reviewed all of the numerous amicus briefs and legal 
transcripts from the preceding trials. The legal clerks were chosen 
from the crème de la crème of America’s brightest young legal 
minds. Few people fully realize how their behind-the-scenes 
opinions help shape the legal outcome of each Supreme Court 
case. It is the role of the clerks to research each appeal, examine 
the stacks of submitted briefs and court records on the case, and 
assist the Justices with the drafts and final opinions. The opinions 
of the clerks carry tremendous weight in deciding how and what 
information reaches the Justices. It is this knowledge that the 
Justices carry with them into chambers during their discussions 
with each other and into the courtroom. 
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Everyone understood that Justice O’Connor was the swing 
vote.9 She was the one that Jean needed to legally persuade. If she 
could convince her, we would get enough votes. Then there were 
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer who were to the “left,” and, 
of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas 
to the “right.” Their votes were relatively predictable. Justice 
Kennedy was considered a liberal but we could not place him on 
either side of the issue. Throughout Amendment 2’s evolution, it 
had been clear to me that the initiative was legally irrational. The 
sole purpose of Amendment 2 was to overturn LGBT protective 
ordinances and preclude LGBTs from bringing any claims of 
discrimination. If you replaced LGBT with any other group of 
people, it easily clarified how irrational and discriminatory the 
measure really was. But staring at the imposing line of Justices 
before me, I remembered that the issue might not be so “cut and 
dried” for others. 
Nine clerks entered and pushed the Justices’ high-backed 
leather chairs forward as they were simultaneously seated. As 
expected, a few brief matters were called and decisions given. 
Then, the Amendment 2 case was called. Showtime! I stared into the 
back of Jean’s head for a response. There was none. In fact, Jean 
was not flinching; her head was poised and her back straight. What 
was going through her mind, I wondered. It had taken far longer 
than first imagined to get here. She hung in like a trooper, her 
style and class bringing solidarity and confidence to everyone 
involved. Jean would be granted just under a half hour to present 
our case. As the respondent, she would go second. Timothy 
Tymkovich, from the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, would go 
first and would probably reserve a portion of his allotted time for 
rebuttal. Whenever attorneys go before an appeals panel, they 
hope to deliver their statements uninterrupted. If the argument is 
not clear, or the Justices want to make points, they may, and usually 
do, interject with questions. Valuable—invaluable—time is wasted. 
Tymkovich rose to speak. Squaring his shoulders, he turned to 
face Chief Justice Rehnquist. “Mr. Chief Justice and may it please 
the Court—this case involves a challenge to the authority of a state 
to allocate certain law-making power among its state and local 
 
 9.  See generally Abigail Perkiss, A Look Back at Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
Court Legacy, YAHOO! (July 2, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/look-back    
-justice-sandra-day-o-connor-court-094809112.html (recognizing Justice O’Connor 
as an important swing voter on the Court at the time Romer was argued). 
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governments. Colorado’s Amendment 2 reserves to the State the 
decision of whether to extend special protections under state law on 
the basis of homosexual or bisexual conduct or orientation.”10 
As the manipulative words “special protections” fell from his 
lips, many of the court Justices seemed to become visibly agitated. 
Good, I thought. Even though the Equal Protection Ordinance 
Coalition (EPOC), the statewide campaign organization fighting 
against Amendment 2, could not effectively confront CFV’s “special 
rights” campaign slogan, maybe the legal arguments could 
confront it. It looked as though at least some of the Justices were 
not going to be as naïve as some Colorado citizens. And how were 
the Justices going to deal with the question of conduct versus 
orientation? 
I knew that the case would move quickly. I also knew that many 
laypeople in the audience would have difficulty understanding the 
legal language being used. Where spectators might have difficulty 
with wording, the body language was quite clear. The Court, like 
the nation, was divided. Tymkovich went on to cite two previous 
Supreme Court decisions. The first, James v. Valtierra,11 focused on 
low-income housing. The second, Hunter v. Erickson,12 focused on 
the issue of race. 
Like the Romer case, the Hunter and James cases included equal 
protection challenges to a referendum or initiative. In Hunter, 
black residents challenged an amendment to a city charter that 
prevented the city council from implementing any ordinance 
dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing 
without the approval of the majority of voters in Akron, Ohio.13 
Like Amendment 2’s attempt to overturn existing protections, the 
Akron city charter amendment sought to overturn an existing city 
protection on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or 
 
 10.  Oral Argument at 0:28, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039. To 
interfere with the author’s narrative as little as possible while remaining faithful to 
the source material, citations to the audio recording of the oral transcript are 
provided at the end of unbroken sections of dialogue from the arguments. The 
William Mitchell Law Review has taken reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of the 
quoted material, but all emphasis within, and interpretation of, the speakers’ 
delivery of dialogue provided in this article conveys the author’s personal 
experience of the live events.  
 11.  402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
 12.  393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 13.  See id. at 385. 
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ancestry.14 The Supreme Court found that this constituted an equal 
protection violation because the amendment to the charter not 
only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding 
housing discrimination, but also made an explicit racial 
classification treating racial housing matters differently from other 
housing matters.15 
The James decision, although relying on the Hunter case, did 
not find an equal protection violation.16 Following the California 
voters’ approval of a referendum that sought to bring public 
housing decisions under the state’s referendum policy, the 
defendants, who were persons eligible for low-cost public housing, 
challenged Article XXXIV of the California constitution.17 The 
article stated that no low-rent housing projects were to be 
developed, constructed, or acquired by any state public body 
without the approval of a majority of those voting at a community 
election.18 The Supreme Court distinguished Hunter and James, 
stating, “Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said 
that California’s Article XXXIV rests on ‘distinctions based on 
race.’”19 “The Article require[d] referendum approval for any low-
rent public housing project, not only for projects [that would] be 
occupied by a racial minority.”20 It was clear that our side wanted 
the Court to analyze the case under Hunter and the State wanted 
the Court to analyze it under James. 
Before Tymkovich could expound on these cases, Justice 
Kennedy stopped Tymkovich’s testimony dead in its tracks. His salt-
and-pepper hair gave his appearance an air of certainty and 
experience. “Usually when we have an equal protection question 
we measure the objective of the legislature against the class that is 
adopted . . . . Here, the classification seems to be adopted for its 
own sake,” Justice Kennedy continued, sounding appalled. “I’ve 
never seen a case like this. Is there any precedent that you can cite 
to the Court where we’ve upheld a law such as this?”21 
 
 14.  Id. at 386–87. 
 15.  Id. at 393. 
 16.  James, 402 U.S. at 143. 
 17.  See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385. 
 18.  Id. at 387. 
 19.  James, 402 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Oral Argument at 1:41, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039. 
8
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Tymkovich tried desperately to establish a link between 
Amendment 2 and James.22 “In James v. Valtierra the Court . . . 
fundamentally looked at whether Hunter v. Erickson should extend 
beyond the specific racial context in which it was decided—” 
Justice Kennedy interrupted immediately. After elaborating on 
the specific legislative purpose of the classification in James, 
Kennedy asserted, “Here, the classification is just adopted for its 
own sake, with reference to all purposes of the law, so James doesn’t 
work. . . . Here, the classification is adopted to ‘fence out,’ in the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s words, the class for all purposes, and 
I’ve never seen a statute like that.”23 
Unconsciously, I brought my right hand up to my temple and 
began running my fingers through my hair. Justice Kennedy’s vote, 
along with Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Souter’s, could not be 
easily predicted. Although it gave an early indication of where he 
stood on the amendment, it was obvious that he had just blown a 
big hole in the State’s case. “Your Honor,” Tymkovich countered, 
“the objective here was to resolve an issue of whether or not to 
extend special protections to homosexuals and bisexuals, so the 
issue resolved here—” 
“Well, Mr. Tymkovich!” Justice O’Connor interrupted, “the 
language of the Amendment, I guess, has never been actually 
interpreted by the Colorado courts!” 
“The Colorado—” Tymkovich began before being cut off 
again. 
“Has it been construed or interpreted as yet, in your view?”24 
Justice O’Connor continued. 
Tymkovich admitted that yes, the Colorado courts made an 
interpretation based on its “face value.” The apparent meaning of 
Amendment 2’s wording overpowered local laws and state 
provisions. In other words, any ordinances in effect in Denver, 
Aspen, Boulder or any other city (as well as statutes passed by the 
state legislature) offering protection from discrimination to gays 
and lesbians were null and void. 
“I mean,” Justice O’Connor proceeded, “the literal language 
would indicate that, for example, a public library could refuse to 
 
 22.  James, 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 23.  Oral Argument at 2:49, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 24.  Id. at 3:10. 
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allow books to be borrowed by homosexuals and there would be no 
relief from that, apparently.”25 
The questions they were asking were a key indication, at least 
to me, that the Justices did understand and accept some of the 
arguments we had filed with the Court. Most importantly, they 
confirmed with each question that there might be something 
indeed wrong with Amendment 2. Hold it, I thought, do not get too 
hopeful now. Worried that I might be reading too much into the 
line of questioning, I turned to my left to look at the Denver City 
Attorney Darleen Ebert’s response to the exchange. Nodding her 
head with each word, she looked at me and silently confirmed what 
I was thinking. YES! 
“And as Justice Kennedy pointed out,” Justice Ginsburg said, 
“James v. Valtierra dealt with one issue, low-cost housing. There were 
dozens of other ways in which to improve the status of the poor, to 
fight against the blight of poverty. But here, it’s everything . . . thou 
shalt not have access to the ordinary legislative process for anything 
that will improve the condition of this particular group . . . and I 
would like to know whether in all of U.S. history there has been any 
legislation like this that earmarks groups and says, you will not be 
able to appeal to your state legislature to improve your status.”26 
I paused it all. Briefly closing my eyes, I slowly inhaled a few 
deep breaths. The entire event felt like a dream. For over four years 
I had “lived” this moment, playing the scene over and over again. 
Measuring my breath, I again looked up. 
“Mr. Tymkovich,” Justice Scalia said firmly, peering over the 
bench, “what about laws prohibiting bigamy, or prohibiting 
homosexuality or homosexual conduct? Incidentally, how do you 
interpret the bisexual orientation language, homosexual, lesbian, 
or bisexual orientation? Does that require any conduct, or is it just 
the disposition?”27 
Here we go, I thought, scrutinizing Justice Scalia’s stern face. 
The conservative Justice was attempting to throw Tymkovich a 
lifeline. By aiming the Court’s attention to a person’s conduct, 
Justice Scalia was giving the attorney an opportunity to distinguish 
between orientation and conduct. If he was successful, the Bowers28 
 
 25.  Id. at 3:54. 
 26.  Id. at 6:05. 
 27.  Id. at 6:48. 
 28.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
10
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case might apply. Other than cases addressing gay people in the 
military, Bowers, decided ten years prior, was the most impactful 
case to be heard by the United States Supreme Court on gay and 
lesbian rights. Unfortunately, it upheld Georgia’s discriminatory 
anti-sodomy law.29 It also made a distinction between homosexual 
conduct and orientation.30 
We decided early on to stay away from the Bowers case; it would 
make our efforts to overturn Amendment 2 far too broad. The 
Bowers case was a disturbing ruling and would be used often to 
focus on behavior of LGBTs as opposed to sexual orientation as a 
classification. Many activists across the country, including me, 
wanted it overturned. However, our attorneys were concerned that 
if we sought to do that with this case, we may bite off more than we 
could chew. Although some of the national organizations were 
pushing in that direction, we wanted to narrow the focus to 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 facts only. Long ago I had learned to 
build a movement on small successes, and biting off too big a piece 
could cause confusion. The probable concern of the Court was that 
someone could challenge a state sodomy law using the Amendment 
2 decision and other creative legal arguments to seek to overturn 
the Bowers case. Many years later, Bowers would be overturned by 
Lawrence v. Texas,31 but at the time, it was a thorny case decision on 
our issues. 
“I want to know,” Justice Scalia interrupted, “what you mean 
by . . . what is meant by . . . if all orientation means is someone who 
engages in homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual acts, then you have 
plenty of precedent in response to your question, namely 
state  laws  that absolutely criminalize such activity . . . bigamy, 
homosexuality—”32 Justice Scalia was determined to aid Tymkovich. 
He quickly tried to get his message across. 
“That’s right! The—” Tymkovich was instantly cut off. 
“Colorado has no law that prohibits consensual homosexual 
conduct,” Justice Ginsburg interrupted.33 She was making a point 
that Colorado did not have a sodomy law, which distinguished this 
case from Bowers. 
 
 29.  Id. at 196. 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 32.  Oral Argument at 7:29, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 33.  Id. at 7:41. 
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“No. Colorado repealed its sodomy law in 1972, but to 
answer—”34 Tymkovich rushed—he had been passed the ball by 
Justice Scalia and was now frantically trying to score. 
“Well?” 
“Justice Scalia’s question, it is unclear whether conduct defines 
the class. Many courts have so held in looking at the issue of a 
classification involving—” 
“You have no position on it? You have no position on it?!” Justice 
Scalia demanded. 
“Yes!” Tymkovich said. Catching onto the lifeline thrust by 
Justice Scalia, the attorney quickly added, “We believe that conduct 
is the best indicator of—” 
“Well, is it the sole indicator?” Justice Souter commanded. 
“Are you representing to this Court that Colorado’s position is that 
the class defining characteristic is conduct as opposed to 
preference or proclivity or whatnot?” 
“No, Your Honor . . . . There was an attempt by the 
respondents to prove a suspect class.”35 
Looking back and forth from Jean to Tymkovich, my heart 
swelled with pride. I was sure it was because Jean’s presentation of 
the case would be more fluid. Her selection as the lead counsel 
demonstrated the importance of selecting the right people for such 
a monumental job. How people dress, talk, act and present 
themselves does make an impression. Personalities, however subtle, 
affect the outcome. As a practicing attorney and judge, I have 
witnessed this notion first hand with jurors. 
Sitting behind the attorneys’ tables gave me a perspective of 
the proceedings I rarely saw anymore. Again, I pondered how 
“human” each player was—and hopefully how humane. Joined in 
the mind of each Justice were the values, morals, legal 
responsibility—heck, even childhood impressions—helping to 
formulate each decision. To deny this fact would be to deny human 
nature. 
Tymkovich was blinking his eyes as he spoke. I held back the 
anger that welled up over the years. No. I would not succumb to the 
bitterness of hate; it had never served me or my causes well. But it 
was difficult—no, it was nearly impossible—to squash the animosity 
that I felt towards the proponents and supporters of the 
 
 34.  Id. at 7:45. 
 35.  Id. at 8:16. 
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discriminatory amendment. I caught myself. This is the same 
animosity held against LGBTs. From that moment forward, I would 
no longer indulge myself with any animosity. 
Tymkovich denied that there was any “arbitrary or irrational” 
discrimination involved in the language of Amendment 2. “No, 
Your Honor. We don’t think—” 
“It’s not a slippery slope argument.” Justice Souter said. 
“You’re not saying we go from . . . if an equal protection challenge 
wins here, a due process challenge necessarily wins too. You’re not 
saying that.” 
“There’s been no due process challenge in this case—” 
Tymkovich said. 
“But,” Justice Souter interrupted, “that’s not what you’re 
arguing.” 
“—and there is—” Tymkovich tried to finish. 
“But, that’s not what you’re arguing, is that—” 
“That’s correct,” Tymkovich said hurriedly. “There is a 
slippery . . . .”36 
I shook my head as I remembered the time I sat across from 
Tymkovich to argue the merits of Amendment 2 and gay rights on 
television. The debate was hosted by Clifford May, a political 
commentator and associate editor of the Rocky Mountain News in 
Denver. Years later, May went on to become the communications 
director to the Republican National Committee. At the time, 
however, he hosted a talk radio program on the dominant station 
in the region and also produced and moderated an interview 
program on KRMA-TV, a PBS station. It was called the 
“Roundtable” and Tymkovich and I sat across from one another at 
that table with May in the middle. I recalled how confident I felt as 
I told the TV host that the Justices would overturn Amendment 2, 
just as they understood that “separate” was not “equal” in Brown v. 
Board of Education.37All these years later, while watching him argue 
before the Supreme Court, I remembered why I felt so assured at 
the time of our debate—he was simply wrong. Tymkovich and I 
would cross career paths again many years after the Romer case, 
when, in 2003, he was appointed to the federal bench by President 
Bush. I had been appointed to a Denver County court judgeship 
three years earlier by Mayor Webb. 
 
 36.  Id. at 11:44. 
 37.  347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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It was clear that some of the Justices understood. But would a 
sufficient number of them agree to keep Amendment 2 
overturned? As was customary, Justice Clarence Thomas had not 
spoken a single word. His mind is made up, I thought. 
“Mr. Tymkovich,” Justice Ginsburg began adamantly, “I was 
trying to think of something comparable to this, and what occurred 
to me is that this political means of going to the local level first is 
familiar in American politics.”38 The Justice was comparing the anti-
discrimination ordinances protecting gays and lesbians in the cities 
of Denver, Aspen, and Boulder to the same type of city ordinances 
that assisted in protecting women for voting purposes.39 
Justice Ginsburg went on, “In fact, it was the way that the 
suffragists worked. When they were unable to achieve the vote 
statewide, they did it on a cities-first approach, and I take it from 
what you are arguing that if there had been a referendum that said 
no local ordinance can give women the vote, that that would have 
been constitutional.” 
“No, Your Honor. I think that . . . that—” 
“What’s the difference?!” she exclaimed. 
“—classification would be analyzed under this Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence on a suspect—”40 Tymkovich was taking 
on something bigger than he was, I thought, shaking my head 
slowly. Was he really going to argue with a female Supreme Court 
Justice about women’s rights? 
“Well,” Justice Ginsburg said leaning forward on her elbows, 
“cast your mind back to the days before the Nineteenth 
Amendment.”41 The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, gave 
women the right to vote.42 No state could deny any person his or 
her constitutional privilege to vote based on gender. Her argument 
made a laughingstock of the State’s case. Questions from the bench 
flew at Tymkovich so fast that he rarely was able to answer 
completely. Faltering through each attempted response, invariably 
a Justice would throw up his or her hand to make Tymkovich stop 
while he or she began arguing with the other Justices. The energy 
in the courtroom was electric, and my head continued to spin. 
 
 38.  Oral Argument at 12:23, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 39.  Colorado’s Tourism Fighting Anti-Gay Boycott, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at 
MN-Main News, available at 1992 WLNR 4063875. 
 40.  Oral Argument at 12:54, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 41.  Id. at 12:57. 
 42.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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Justice Ginsburg was my hero. Her line of questioning 
demonstrated that she truly understood civil rights.43 
“No court has found homosexual orientation or conduct to be 
a suspect classification. Therefore, the traditional equal protection 
model should be applied in this case,”44 Tymkovich stated. The 
attorney was honing in on a delicate spot. Conservative members of 
the bench felt that gays and lesbians should not be in the same class 
as race, gender, age, and other protected classes. Engaged, he too 
expanded on the issue of suspect classification. Then suddenly, the 
line of questioning shifted. 
“When you talk about ‘special protections,’” Justice Scalia 
remarked pointedly, “this brings me to an earlier question about 
discrimination in libraries. How do you interpret the term, 
minority status quota preferences protected status?” he asked. “You 
mean—what does that mean?”45 
The question was another attempt to aid the attorney, allowing 
him a chance to denounce classifying homosexuals as a legally 
protected class. 
“Protected status would be a particular affirmative positive 
piece of legislation that granted some type of protection—” 
Tymkovich said before being cut off. 
“Special protection beyond what—” Justice Scalia interrupted. 
“Beyond the Fourteenth Amendment baseline.”46 Tymkovich 
had happily taken the bait. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 
1868, along with the First and Fourth Amendments, is the most 
 
 43.  Little did I know that over a decade later I would get to personally 
introduce Justice Ginsburg at a judicial conference. With the help of a former 
federal woman judge who I knew through the Colorado Woman’s Bar Association, 
I was able to secure Justice Ginsburg as one of the keynote speakers along with a 
Justice from the Canadian Supreme Court. My reward for doing so was that I got 
to introduce her at the opening plenary session to all 550 judges in attendance. My 
tenure as chair of the American Judges Association’s Education Committee 
culminated in coordinating this conference. It was held in Vancouver, Canada and 
included the American Judges Association, the Canadian Provincial Judges 
Association, a few individual Provincial Judges Associations and, at the behest of 
LGBT Canadian Judge Gary Cohen and myself, the LGBT Judges Association. The 
only thing that I loved more than breaking new ground as a gay person was the 
cross-pollination of straight and gay organizations. This conference proved to be 
one of the highlights of my legal career.  
 44.  Oral Argument at 13:39, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 45.  Id. at 14:45. 
 46.  Id. at 14:58. 
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called-upon constitutional provision in Supreme Court cases.47 It 
forbids the enforcement or creation by any state of any law that 
infringes on the individual’s rights under the U.S. Constitution.48 It 
was intended to protect citizens against any state action that results 
in deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law—or in denial of the equal protection of the laws. 
“So,” Justice Scalia followed, “why wouldn’t that have been 
your answer to the library hypothetical that was produced earlier?! 
Any—no homosexual can be treated differently from other people. 
He simply cannot be given special protection by reason of that 
status.” 
“That’s right!” Tymkovich agreed. “Amendment 2 is simply a 
Fourteenth Amendment—”49 Justice Scalia had led the horse to 
water and Tymkovich was ready to drink. 
Justice Stevens aborted the fleeting triumph. “May I ask how 
that works in the public accommodation area? If a hotel or 
restaurant—at common law you get some kind of an innkeeper’s 
duty to take everybody in. Could an innkeeper refuse 
accommodations to a homosexual who was not engaging in any 
homosexual conduct but had admitted that he had that type of 
tendency? Could an innkeeper under—in Colorado just say, ‘I’m 
sorry, we don’t rent rooms to people like you?’”50 Ironically, this 
argument would serve to foreshadow a case decided almost twenty 
years later on the issue of whether businesses open to the public 
could deny services based upon their religious beliefs.51 
“Amendment 2 would carve out any special protections in the 
public accommodation area that had been extended to 
homosexuals—” Tymkovich replied. 
 
 47.  See Barry Horwitz, A Fresh Look at A Stale Doctrine: How Public Policy and the 
Tenets of Piercing the Corporate Veil Dictate the Inapplicability of the Intracorporate 
Conspiracy Doctrine to the Civil Rights Arena, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 131, 134 n.35 
(2008) (“[S]ection 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is arguably the most 
important and most litigated law in the nation’s history.” (citing Sanford Levinson, 
Why It’s Smart to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 364 
(2000))); Martin Kelly, 14th Amendment Summary, ABOUT.COM, http:// 
americanhistory.about.com/od/usconstitution/a/14th-Amendment-Summary 
.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (“Over time, numerous lawsuits have arisen that 
have referenced the 14th amendment.”). 
 48.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 49.  Oral Argument at 15:17, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 50.  Id. at 15:40. 
 51.  See supra, note 3 and accompanying text. 
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“What would the rule be in Colorado? How do you understand 
the law there? Now, would a homosexual have a right to be served 
in a restaurant?” Justice Stevens insisted. 
“A homosexual would not have any claim of discrimination or 
special liability theory in a private setting after Amendment 2,” 
Tymkovich admitted. 
“Even in the public accommodation area,” Justice Stevens 
continued.52 
I, like others in the courtroom, was on the edge of my seat. 
The exchange demonstrated how gays and lesbians would be 
targeted for discrimination where other citizens were not. 
“So we don’t know whether homosexuals have a right to be 
served or not,” Justice Stevens continued. 
“That will be a question for the state courts interpreting 
Amendment 2,” Tymkovich said. “But, if they do have a right to be 
served, would that be an affirmative right, then, as in the 
distinction Justice Scalia was drawing, or would that be just being 
treated like everybody else?” 
“I think,” Tymkovich responded, choosing his words carefully, 
“it would be treated just like any other characteristic or 
classification that has not gotten the special benefits of the civil 
rights law.” 
“And being—having the right not to be refused a job or to rent 
on that ground is a special right,” Justice Stevens queried with 
eyebrows raised. 
“Unless—” Tymkovich tried to interject. 
“It’s not being just like everybody else,” the Justice finished.53 
That’s right, I responded gently nodding my head. I was totally 
invested in the case. There was not a day that had gone by over the 
years that I had not thought about this moment. As a tear trickled 
down my face, I quickly raised the back of my hand to brush it 
away. Suddenly, I stopped. So what, let them see it, I reasoned. This 
was a tear of struggle. These were our civil rights they were talking 
about. Shifting in my chair to a more upright position, I raised my 
head and searched the faces of the Justices. 
Arguing about the supposed “rational basis” for Amendment 2, 
it appeared to me that the Justices were in disagreement about 
whether people outside of Aspen had a right to tell the citizens of 
 
 52.  Oral Argument at 16:17, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 53.  Id. at 17:04. 
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Aspen whether or not they could elect to have a nondiscriminatory 
provision. Could the State of Colorado tell one of its cities that it 
can no longer conform to its own laws? 
“There’s a question about the desirability of each local 
jurisdiction dealing with this issue,” Tymkovich contested, “which I 
think raises some very fundamental and sensitive cultural, moral, 
political concerns for our state.”54 His neck, I realized, was clearly 
on the line with such a statement. 
Justice Souter continued to press Tymkovich on this issue until 
Justice Scalia suddenly exploded, “MR. TYMKOVICH! If this is an 
ordinary equal protection challenge and there’s no heightened 
scrutiny, isn’t it an adequate answer to Justice Souter’s question to 
say that this is the only area in which we’ve had a problem? If 
localities started passing special laws giving favored treatment to 
people with blue eyes, we might have a statewide referendum on 
that as well. Isn’t one step at a time a normal response to equal 
protection?” 
“That’s exactly what happened here,” Tymkovich struggled to 
edge in, “and the court—” 
“Well, what is the problem?”55 Justice Souter said 
admonishingly. Suddenly throwing a court brief across the bench, 
the Justice seemed incensed. “I mean, what is the problem that you 
supposedly have been having?!” 
Tymkovich said, “[L]aws that raise particular and sensitive 
liberty concerns.” 
Justice Scalia joined in another attempt to rescue the 
floundering attorney. “State—state subdivisions giving preferences 
which the majority of the people in the state did not think were 
desirable for social reasons, isn’t that the problem that was seen?”56 
Justice Scalia offered. There it was, the majority rules argument, I 
thought. Let’s put my rights up for vote! 
“That’s right,”57 Tymkovich said, relieved. 
“Isn’t your answer, this is the only area where the people 
apparently saw a problem, which is enough for equal protection?” 
Justice Scalia continued. 
“It is,” the attorney said, “and this is an area where there have 
been piecemeal additions of special protections. We’ve had—” 
 
 54.  Id. at 20:50. 
 55.  Id. at 22:06. 
 56.  Id. at 22:30. 
 57.  Id. at 22:31. 
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“What is the special preference at stake here? What is the 
special preference that a homosexual gets?”58 questioned Justice 
Stevens. Each trying to be heard, the Justices’ raised voices layered 
over each other. I was breathless. 
“[W]ith this Amendment on the books, a restaurant owner can 
say, ‘Sorry, I don’t want to serve gay people,’ and what about—take 
a scarce resource. Think of a public hospital that has a kidney 
dialysis machine, and the hospital says, ‘We have to limit this, and 
one group that we’re going to keep out, we’re not going to have 
any gay, any lesbian person use this—use this facility.’ Now there 
would be, under this Amendment, what recourse?!”59 asked Justice 
Ginsburg. 
“[T]hat’s the rule that the public hospital sets. Under this 
Amendment, that’s okay, right?!” 
Tymkovich stated, “[W]e don’t know how the court is going to 
construe other potentially applicable state laws.” 
“How—I do have one question on that point which I’d like to 
ask,” Justice Breyer said. “The statute says, ‘no agency shall adopt or 
enforce any policy whereby homosexual conduct, or whatever, 
orientation, shall be the basis of any claim of discrimination.’60 So if 
a police department says, ‘There’s been a lot of gay bashing. It’s 
our policy. Stop it.’ If the head librarian says, ‘You’re making gays 
sit—you’re being mean to them and not letting them in. Stop it.’ If 
the health department says the same thing, if the insurance 
commissioner says the same thing, doesn’t this word policy cover 
that, and if it doesn’t cover it, what is it about?” 
“The government agencies that you’ve indicated could enact a 
general non-bias policy or require—” Tymkovich said.61 “It 
prohibits any type of special protection or a liability claim that 
somebody might have under that policy,” he replied firmly. 
“It seems to me,” Justice Kennedy said, “that your answer is 
inconsistent to what the Supreme Court of Colorado said. It said 
health insurance discrimination regulations are void.” 
“The health—” the attorney began. 
“That’s . . . based on sexual orientation.” Justice Kennedy 
interrupted. 
 
 58.  Id. at 22:56. 
 59.  Id. at 23:46. 
 60.  COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2013 
amendments). 
 61.  Oral Argument at 25:14, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
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“The health—that regulation did carve out what would be 
construed as special protection,” Tymkovich replied. 
“That’s inconsistent with the answer you gave to Justice 
Breyer!” 
“I don’t think so, Your Honor,” Tymkovich said, “because I 
thought he was talking about a law of general application—” 
“No! Look, suppose Boulder, Colorado says, ‘It is our policy in 
Boulder not to discriminate against gays.’ They call it Boulder 
Regulation 14.2. Is that forbidden by this?” Justice Breyer asked. 
“Yes,” Tymkovich finally conceded, “It would be to the 
extent—” 
“All right,” Justice Breyer interrupted. “Now, suppose the 
police department does exactly the same thing. Is that forbidden by 
this?” 
“The police department would be governed by a rule of 
general applica—” the attorney continued. 
“So, the police department—” 
“They would not be able to—” Tymkovich rushed. 
“I don’t understand. So is the city of Colorado,” Justice Breyer 
said, mixing his words. “They’re all governed by, they can’t 
discriminate arbitrarily. My point is, suppose that the police 
department says exactly the same thing. You say that’s not 
forbidden.” 
“That’s correct,” the attorney said, sounding exhausted. 
“Okay.” 
“Your Honor?” Tymkovich said. “May I reserve the balance of 
my time for rebuttal?” 
“Yes,” Chief Justice Rehnquist said calmly. “Thank you, Mr. 
Tymkovich. Ms. Dubofsky, we’ll hear from you.”62 
Jean rose gracefully; her courtroom demeanor was spirited and 
alive, and her delivery was clear and concise. Due to her 
impeccable legal experience as an attorney and former justice of 
the Colorado Supreme Court, she had pedigree and seemed to be 
respected. 
“Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Let me begin 
with how Amendment 2 should be construed and then discuss how 
our legal theories relate to its unique combination of breadth and 
selectivity,” she began. “Amendment 2 is vertically broad in that it 
prohibits all levels of government in the State of Colorado from ever 
 
 62.  Id. at 27:34. 
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providing any opportunity for one to seek protection from 
discrimination on the basis of gay orientation.”63 
Not only did Jean carefully choose which words to emphasize, 
she opened her testimony using the word “gay.” Tymkovich refused 
to use the word at all, choosing instead to say “homosexual.” Even 
the Justices used the word “gay” in their line of questioning.64 
“Well,” Chief Justice Rehnquist began, “when you say ‘all levels 
of government in Colorado,’ Ms. Dubofsky, you don’t include the 
people by referendum, I take it, or the people by initiative.” 
“No, we do not.” 
“And I have one more very specific question,” Justice Kennedy 
said. “What about the courts? Can the courts interpret a statute that 
prohibits unreasonable denial of public accommodations to 
include gays by a specific judgment that deals with the rights of gay 
people?” 
“The state,” Jean said, referring to the Colorado Supreme 
Court decision, “has conceded that Amendment 2 is 
unconstitutional to the degree it would prohibit such a claim based 
upon federal law since 1983.” 
“No, no, no. I meant state courts interpreting state public 
accommodation laws,” the Justice boomed. 
“Our theory,” Jean replied, unwavering, “is that Amendment 2 
on its face prohibits a state court from recognizing such a claim, 
but that particular interpretation of the amendment is not 
necessary for this Court to find that Amendment 2 is 
unconstitutional.” 
“Thank you, and that particular interpretation has not been 
given by the supreme court of Colorado,” Justice Kennedy stated.65 
It was an attempt, I figured, to discredit Jean’s firm stance 
concerning what the Colorado court intended by its decision to 
overturn Amendment 2. The United States Supreme Court had the 
 
 63.  Id. at 28:13. 
 64.  The GLBT community generally refers to itself as the “gay” community 
rather than “homosexual” community. The word “homosexual” sounds either too 
clinical or religiously-forbidden since it includes “sex” as part of the identity. CFV 
capitalized on the word homosexual during the campaign by placing it in its 
campaign materials to focus in on the “sexual” behaviour of gays. They distributed 
a video to voters that depicted gay men participating in the gay parade while nude. 
To make “sex” the centrepiece of the gay lifestyle, it moved the argument from 
orientation to behaviour. Duke Law Sch., Romer v. Evans, YOUTUBE (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZEZ7PMQbQE. 
 65.  Oral Argument at 29:14, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
21
Celeste: Oyez, Oyez: An Inside Look at Romer v. Evans
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
2015] AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS 65 
prerogative to remand the case back to the Colorado Supreme 
Court for interpretation of the Amendment: a decision that would 
belabor our case. It was a potential outcome that none of us 
wanted. 
“That’s right,” the attorney said. “The Colorado Supreme 
Court interpreted the amendment, and it said it was doing this as a 
minimum, because that was all that was necessary in order to find 
the amendment unconstitutional. 
“It interpreted the amendment to mean that state and local 
governments are barred from promulgating and enforcing rules 
that declare discrimination against gay people by both government 
and private actors to be arbitrary, so that would include Justice 
Breyer’s general policy suggestion with respect to the police 
department,” Jean added. 
“[C]ounsel for the other side said, ‘No . . . it doesn’t forbid any 
of these agencies from having such a rule,’” Justice Breyer stated. 
“The Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of this 
amendment is authoritative for purposes of this argument, I 
believe,” Jean replied, “and the Colorado Supreme Court—” 
“Where does it say that in the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
opinion?!” Justice Scalia retorted.66 
Everyone in the packed room suddenly took a deep breath. If 
Jean could not recall exactly which passage addressed the issue of 
the Amendment’s unconstitutionality, our team would instantly 
lose credibility. It also raised the possibility of having Amendment 2 
remanded back to Colorado’s trial court for interpretation. 
Glancing down at her legal pad, Jean’s index finger instantly 
came to rest. “It says that,” Jean said, looking directly at the Justice, 
“on page B-3, D-24—” 
The courtroom was abuzz. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
interrupted, “of the white appendix, or the—”67 
“Yes,” Jean interjected before he could finish, “in the white 
appendix. B-3, D-24, and D-25.” 
“D as in does?” 
“D as in David, or does, yes.” Jean said, her voice warm and her 
manner controlled, “and the way in which the Colorado Supreme 
Court says that is by giving examples of the types of provisions that 
 
 66.  Id. at 30:17. 
 67.  Id. at 30:22. 
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would be repealed by the amendment, or precluded from 
enactment in the future.” 
“B-3?” Justice Scalia mumbled. “What does it say on B-3 that 
says that?”68 
Jean was restraining any sign of frustration. The Justice was 
clearly wasting valuable time, but to give any indication of 
annoyance would be detrimental. Tymkovich had stuttered and 
stammered his way through responses to questions, at times at a 
loss for critical information. It was better, I knew, to be slow in 
one’s response—at least until the controlled and proper reply was 
clear. 
“Is it B—” Justice Breyer began. 
“It—B-3—you said B as in—” Justice Scalia asked, befittingly. 
“B as in boy,” Jean said resolutely. 
“It seems to me it says the effect, the ultimate effect is to 
prohibit any government entity from adopting similar or more 
protective statutes, regulations, or orders in the future.” 
“Yes,” Jean replied calmly, “and it refers back to the first 
sentence. It says, the immediate objective of Amendment 2 is at a 
minimum to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and 
policies. Then on pages—” 
“Wait,” Justice Scalia said raising his palm toward Jean, “that 
barred discrimination based on sexual orientation. I assume that 
that means special provisions giving special protection—” 
“Well—” Jean began. 
“—as opposed to a general law that says you have to, not just 
accept homosexuals, but all citizens have to be accommodated at 
hotels.” 
“That’s correct,” Jean confirmed. After a brief pause, she 
continued, “There are general laws that say—” 
“As opposed to a special law that says a private homeowner 
who wants to rent a room—you know, the mom and a family that 
wants to do bed and breakfast cannot discriminate . . . .” Justice 
Scalia interjected, eyeing to clarify his disapproval. “Although it has 
no obligation to take the public at large, it can decide to take only 
Irishmen if it wants, but it cannot discriminate on the basis of 
homosexuality. I thought that’s the kind of thought the court is 
referring to here.” 
“The Colorado Supreme Court is referring to?” Jean repeated. 
 
 68.  Id. at 30:59. 
23
Celeste: Oyez, Oyez: An Inside Look at Romer v. Evans
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
2015] AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS 67 
“Yes.” 





the general ordinances that were preempted by 
Amendment 2 . . . .” 
“You mean no general laws can be applied to homosexuals 
now?!” Justice Scalia asked. “They can be bashed, they can be 
murdered, they—all sorts of things! Is that what it means?!”69 
Jean was not about to be suckered into such a line of 
questioning. Taking a breath and shifting to her left foot, she 
leaned forward and said, “We think it can mean that, but we don’t 
think the Colorado Supreme Court found it necessary to go that far 
in its interpretation—” She continued, “and we’re not arguing that 
it needs to be interpreted that broadly in order to find Amendment 
2 unconstitutional,” Jean said matter-of-factly.70 
“I think,” she began slowly, “we’re having trouble . . . with 
semantics. One of the difficulties is the use of the words ‘special 
protection’ in this case. I don’t think there is such a thing as 
‘special rights’ or ‘special protections.’ I think there’s a right which 
everyone has to be free from arbitrary discrimination!”71 
As the Justices proceeded to argue and define arbitrary 
discrimination at various levels of government, I tried to sort 
through the arguments. The Justices needed to be kept on track 
with regard to the devastation Amendment 2 would wreak on gay 
and lesbian civil rights. Jean was doing a heck of a job maintaining 
the panel’s focus on Amendment 2’s inherent evils. 
The courtroom was mesmerized as Jean drove home her 
points with refined articulation and nonverbal movements. She 
moved her hands as she spoke, turning her head to look at each 
Justice to accentuate her points. Assertive, yes, but Jean drew the 
line at direct confrontation. She wanted and needed to hold the 
interest of the nine Justices long enough to make her main point—
the Colorado Supreme Court found Amendment 2 
unconstitutional, and they should as well. Returning swift and clear 
answers, Jean kept the conversation moving. 
“Let me put it to you this way,” Justice Kennedy said to Jean, 
“suppose there’s a Colorado ordinance, or city ordinance which 
said you cannot bar people from public accommodations for any 
 
 69.  Id. at 32:45. 
 70.  Id. at 32:59. 
 71.  Id. at 33:27. 
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arbitrary or unreasonable reason. . . . After this amendment, could 
a court in Colorado find that it was unreasonable or arbitrary to bar 
a person from public accommodations by reason of sexual 
orientation?” 
“I think a court could find that, yes,” Jean said.72 “If that 
criteria in the particular case is because the person who was denied 
that benefit is a gay person, then I think under Amendment 2 the 
court would not be able to provide relief. . . . Amendment 2, if 
interpreted at its broadest, would authorize that type of 
discrimination.”73 
Reporters’ pens were flying as they took notes and tried to 
keep up with every word. The noise level in the courtroom was at a 
low hum with spectators shuffling in their seats, clearing their 
throats, and rattling paper. 
The Justices branched off to argue amongst themselves, 
through Jean, about whether any part of Amendment 2, if applied, 
was constitutional. 
“We’re saying,” Jean repeated, “that the minimal interpretation 
that the Colorado Supreme Court gave to this in all of its 
applications is invalid. Because there may be other types of 
applications of this amendment, we don’t have to deal with those in 
this particular facial challenge because they’re basically irrelevant.”74 
“Suppose that Colorado is concerned that one city has passed 
an ordinance giving preference to gays in employment hiring, and 
for any number of reasons the citizens of Colorado do not want 
that. Some people say they want uniform laws because it’s easier on 
employers. Could the citizens of Colorado by referendum repeal 
that ordinance?” Justice Kennedy asked. 
“Could they also provide that no such ordinance shall be 
adopted in the future?”75 he added. 
“That’s where it gets more difficult. That’s where our political 
participation argument comes to play, that by disabling a 
government from responding to a need for a particular benefit, the 
type of protection that—it depends upon the circumstances,” Jean 
said. 
“Well,” Justice Kennedy began, “it would seem a little odd that 
there could be an ordinance enacted, then repealed by the 
 
 72.  Id. at 36:28. 
 73.  Id. at 37:43. 
 74.  Id. at 40:38. 
 75.  Id. at 44:00. 
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referendum, then the ordinance is enacted again, then repealed—
it just goes back and forth!”76 
Justice Kennedy had addressed the same issue that Judy 
Harrington, the anti-Amendment 2 campaign manager, and I had 
discussed with respect to whether a repeal effort against 
Amendment 2 would have been more effective than the 
constitutional challenge. Would we have been playing legislative 
and electoral ping-pong if we sought a repeal? 
“There are other problems with dealing with civil rights 
protections and generally, but let’s say they passed Amendment 2 
but it didn’t target gay people. It simply said that no one can obtain 
any protection from discrimination, arbitrary discrimination for 
any reason. That would not present the problem that Amendment 
2 presents. Amendment 2 is very selective. It targets only one group of 
people, and that’s where it encounters equal protection 
difficulties,” Jean explained. “The State may be able to rearrange its 
process in any number of ways. It just can’t do it in a way that 
prevents one particular group.”77 
Justice Scalia was not buying it. Returning to his earlier line of 
questioning, the Justice wanted a full definition of “who” exactly 
Amendment 2 did target. “How do you read the statute when it 
refers to sexual orientation, homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships?” Justice Scalia 
asked. “Suppose a person who, let’s say, has a tendency to 
homosexual conduct, but has never engaged in homosexual 
conduct, is that person—would an ordinance that relates to that 
person be covered by this?” 
“Yes,” Jean replied firmly. “The Colorado Supreme Court did 
interpret this initiative in this regard. It said that homosexual 
conduct was subsumed within homosexual orientation, and—” 
“Well, I’m sure it is, but what else? I mean, that’s the problem. 
What else?” 
“I don’t understand what you mean by ‘what else,’” Jean boldly 
countered. 
“Beyond homosexual conduct.”78 
Jean and Justice Scalia continued to dispute the meaning of 
“homosexual conduct” and where it fit into Amendment 2. Jean 
 
 76.  Id. at 44:52. 
 77.  Id. at 45:52. 
 78.  Id. at 46:48. 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/3
 
70 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
finally told the Court that homosexual “conduct” and “orientation” 
were not mutually exclusive.79 Her point was to reinforce her earlier 
statement: Amendment 2 was extremely broad in its attack on the 
civil and political rights of its citizens. 
Suddenly, the audience’s concentration was broken. 
Conservative Justice Scalia directed a curt question about whether 
Jean’s intention was to overturn Bowers. My colleagues and I had 
feared such a reference.80 
In the very last row of the courtroom, supporters from 
Colorado were conducting their own exchanges. Some of the men 
had their heads bent praying; most of the women were transfixed 
by the electrifying exchange unfolding before then. Others were 
crying. The delegation grasped each other’s hands creating a silent 
network. Please, let this be the decade that they say “yes” to civil 
rights for gays and lesbians. It has to be now. 
“Ms. Dubofsky, do you contend that—are you asking us to 
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick?!” Justice Scalia stormed. 
“No, I am not,” Jean replied. 
“Well, there we said that you could make homosexual conduct 
criminal. Why can a state not take a step short of that and say, 
‘We’re not going to make it criminal, but on the other hand, we 
certainly don’t want to encourage it, and therefore we will neither 
have a state law giving it special protection,’” the Justice drilled, 
“nor will we allow any municipalities to give it special protection. It 
seems to me the legitimacy of the one follows from the legitimacy 
of the other; if you can criminalize it, surely you can take that latter 
step, can’t you?!” 
 
 79.  See, e.g., Janet Lever & David E. Kanouse, Sexual Orientation and Proscribed 
Sexual Behaviors, in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY 15, 33 
(Gregory M. Herek et al. eds., 1996) (“Although current military policy equates 
homosexual status (i.e., homosexual identity) with homosexual conduct (i.e., 
sexual behaviors), data indicate that they are not the same.”). Homosexual 
“conduct” was a more difficult argument to defend against. The underlying 
presumption is that conduct is not a mutable characteristic and therefore does not 
deserve any heightened scrutiny under equal protection arguments. Id. at 22–23. 
“Status,” on the other hand, denotes something more inherent and removes the 
sexual conduct as the focus. Id. 
 80.  Our intention was not to get lost in the weeds in an attempt to overturn 
Bowers. We wanted to keep it narrowly focused on Colorado’s Amendment 2. In 
retrospect, given how Lawrence v. Texas shook out six years later, this seems to have 
been the right call. Arguably, in 1996, the country was not yet ready for that 
change. 
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I sank into the back of my chair. Emotionally, I was exhausted. 
My eyes bounced back and forth from the verbal attack on Jean to 
the LGBT community members in the audience and back to the 
Supremes. I wished that the whole thing would vanish or that I 
could just disappear. 
In response to the last arrow shot, Jean responded, “What 
you’ve done is deprived people, based on their homosexual 
orientation, of a whole opportunity to seek protection from 
discrimination, which is a very different thing.” 
“So, do you do it when you throw them in jail for a felony?!”81 
Justice Scalia exclaimed. 
What a degrading question, I thought, my mind briefly jogging 
back to a media story about Rush Limbaugh’s third wedding being 
officiated by Justice Clarence Thomas.82 What does sodomy have to 
do with whether someone is allowed to eat in a restaurant, check 
out a book, receive medical care, or secure employment? Back then 
we did not even conceive that people would refuse to bake wedding 
cakes or take photos for a gay wedding. In the 1990s, the 
constitutional right to marry was in its fledgling stages. 
At that same time, Hawaii, the first state to pass gay marriage 
legislation—which would later be reversed—had LGBT tourists 
travelling there to get married.83 The relationship between the 
Amendment 2 case and the Hawaii same-sex marriage case, I knew, 
was an important one. Pending in the Hawaii state courts was the 
first major same-sex marriage case.84 The case began in 1991, a year 
prior to the passage of Amendment 2. Three same-sex couples were 
denied marriage licenses after exchanging vows. Challenging the 
refusal in Hawaii’s lower courts, the couples, represented by 
attorneys from Lambda Legal, were again denied. They appealed 
the decision to Hawaii’s Supreme Court in May 1993. There the 
couples found hope, as did gays and lesbians across the country. 
 
 81.  Oral Argument at 53:12, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
 82.  Glenn Greenwald, Congrats to Rush Limbaugh on His Fourth Traditional 
Marriage, SALON (June 6, 2010, 6:07 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/06/06 
/marriage_18/. 
 83.  See Hawaiian Judge Upholds Same-Sex Marriages, CNN (Dec. 3, 1996, 5:50 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9612/03/same.sex.marriage/. 
 84.  See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also 1993: The Hawaii 
Case of Baehr v. Lewin, FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/marriage/1993-the       
-hawaii-case-of-baehr-v-lewin.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (summarizing the 
holding of Baehr). 
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The state high court ruled that the denial of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples appeared to violate Hawaii’s constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection.85 
The couples argued that by allowing same-sex marriage, the 
state would benefit, children of gays and lesbians would benefit, 
and Hawaii would suffer no adverse effects. The lower court 
decision was appealed again and the case went back to the Hawaii 
Supreme Court in 1996, around the time that the Romer case went 
to the United States Supreme Court. Same-sex marriage was in the 
same hotbed of legal uncertainty as was Amendment 2. Once gays 
and lesbians could legally marry in Hawaii, couples would 
eventually travel to other states and challenge any anti-gay marriage 
laws in effect. The Hawaiian government took three years, at the 
taxpayers’ expense, to justify sex discrimination in marriage. 
Attorneys for the government tried to show that same-sex marriages 
would adversely affect children; children should grow up in 
conventional families, and the State had an interest in promoting 
traditional families. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)86 was 
passed in 1996, the same year as the Romer decision.  
I focused my attention back on the oral argument. Jean was 
still responding to Justice Scalia’s comparison of Amendment 2 and 
Bowers. 
“If homosexuals were put into the language of Amendment 2 
only in terms of, those people who engage in homosexual conduct 
shall not be entitled to ever seek protection under the civil rights 
laws, we would say that is unconstitutional,” Jean exclaimed. “That’s 
a very different thing from saying that you can criminalize 
homosexual sodomy!” she added. 
“Then how do you answer Justice Kennedy’s further question, 
well, isn’t the State entitled to end a ping-pong game? The locality 
passes it, the State repeals it. The locality passes it again, the State 
repeals it again,” Justice Ginsburg interjected. 
“The constitutional bar, in effect, to ever adopting a protection 
of any sort, or an opportunity to seek protection from 
discrimination, is a very different type of barrier than a simple 
repealer and reenactment, because it means that if the group is 
 
 85.  Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. 
 86.  Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). 
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going to ever obtain any protection, it has to amend the state 
constitution first.”87 Jean said. 
“Yes, but wouldn’t you say that it could end the ping-pong ball 
that way if it ends it with respect to all protection against private 
discrimination?” Justice Souter asked. 
“That’s correct, it could,” Jean affirmed. 
“That would not be an equal protection problem.” 
“That’s right. That’s right,” Jean repeated. 
“So you’re saying, if I understand you, you just can’t end the 
ping-pong ball for this particular group?” 
“That’s correct,” Jean replied, “or any particular group.” 
“Right. Right.” 
“It doesn’t matter who the group is—” 
“Yes. Yes,” Justice Souter tried to finish. 
“—you just couldn’t do it this way,” Jean said looking into the 
Justices’ faces. 
“But, you can end the game.” 
“That’s correct,” Jean agreed.88 
“Thank you, Ms. Dubofsky,” Chief Justice Rehnquist said. 
“Thank you,” Jean replied as she sat down.89 
Tymkovich rose to make his rebuttal. He had approximately 
one minute in which to do so and began by quickly bringing 
attention to the civil rights of the people of Colorado to pass and 
enact an initiative. “Your Honor, the Colorado Supreme Court rule 
basically holds that preemption is unconstitutional,” the attorney 
opened. Before he was done with his reasoning on that particular 
point he was again interrupted. 
“Well, excuse me,” Justice Souter interjected, “I don’t see where 
it said preemption was unconstitutional, as distinct from saying, 
preemption for one identifiable group was unconstitutional.” 
Tymkovich was stepping in the wrong territory now, I thought. 
“It’s preemption of this issue that affects a group, and in James 
the Court told us it’s permissible—”90 Tymkovich’s explanation was 
cut off. There was the James case again.91 As a young attorney, I was 
once told that if the facts in a case are against you, you argue the 
 
 87.  Oral Argument at 55:00, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039. 
 88.  Id. at 55:53. 
 89.  Id. at 56:12. 
 90.  Id. at 56:45. 
 91.  See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
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law and vice versa. This was certainly true during the last hour. Jean 
and the more liberal Justices discussed the factual implications of 
Amendment 2, while Tymkovich and Justice Scalia wanted to talk 
about the James92 and Bowers93 cases. 
“Well, it doesn’t—it doesn’t—” Justice Souter interrupted, “the 
ordinance speaks both in terms of issue, i.e., basis for claim, and 
group. I mean, it refers to both, doesn’t it? You can’t have one 
without the other, the way the ordinance is—” 
“It’s an issue that affects a group, like in James and like in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft,”94 Tymkovich continued to explain, “where we 
had an age restriction in the state.” 
“Well, isn’t it in effect defined in terms of the group under 
traditional equal protection analysis, which looks to the intent of the 
enacting body?” 
“Right,” Tymkovich said, “and then there would be the 
question—” 
“Okay,” Justice Souter interrupted, holding up his hand. 
“—of whether a rational basis supports that,” Tymkovich said, 
struggling to fit in a more detailed explanation. 
“Thank you, Mr.—” Chief Justice Rehnquist began. 
“In this case—” Tymkovich said over the Justice. 
“Thank you, Mr. Tymkovich,” Chief Justice Rehnquist stated 
firmly. “The case is submitted.”95 
It was exactly 11:01 a.m. 
More than four years of waiting ended in one hour of United 
States Supreme Court points and counterpoints. As in most cases, 
the Justices utilized the attorneys as conduits to convey their own 
positions to each other. I took one last look at the imported marble 
encrusted with symbolic sculpture decorating the courtroom. Now 
the entire country would have to wait to see who among the nine 
Justices had been persuaded. 
Once the Court was adjourned, spectators and journalists 
rushed to spread word of the oral arguments to the rest of the 
world. As the Colorado delegation exited the courthouse and 
descended the long white stairs, we were bombarded by 
international, national, and local press. Having set up their 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 94.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 95.  Oral Argument at 57:21, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039). 
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technical equipment promptly after ticketed guests entered the 
courthouse, the journalists anxiously awaited word of the hearing. 
Recording devices of every size and shape littered the center of the 
courtyard. Microphones with various station logos extended into 
our faces as numerous TV cameras strained to catch a glimpse of 
attorneys and plaintiffs together. 
Stepping ahead to issue the first comments to reporters, 
Suzanne Goldberg from Lambda Legal and Matt Coles, an attorney 
from the ACLU, both attempted to legally interpret and impart 
what had occurred inside. After waiting patiently, Jean and I 
addressed the journalists who were still hungry for a sensational 
comment for their news stories. 
Descriptive renditions of the precedent-setting legal arguments 
were only beginning to reverberate across the nation. We knew that 
this first meeting with reporters was critical as to how America 
would understand what had occurred inside. It was one thing to tell 
the media our viewpoints regarding how the oral arguments 
unfolded; it was quite another to voice the collective opinion of the 
Justices and “foretell” their pending decision. 
Our activities had climaxed into a political zenith that neither 
Jean nor I had previously experienced. It was a moment of shared 
bitter sweetness enriching our already extensive legal histories. One 
half hour to dramatically influence those who judge the nation’s 
injustice. Relieved that the oral arguments had progressed as they 
had, all of us knew the contentment was temporary. Our fight to 
overturn Amendment 2 now rested in the hands of nine very 
human Americans. 
“I am famished!” Jean said, turning to Katherine, her assistant. 
She had just finished taking questions from reporters, and the 
dense crowd outside was slowly breaking up. 
“Me too, Jean.” 
“Yeah, let’s go get some lunch,” I said. 
“Let’s all go have lunch together at the Monocle,” Jean 
offered. 
Heading down the street on foot, I strained to see between 
government buildings to the neighborhoods beyond. Inside the 
courtroom, I had never lost sight of what the case was truly about: 
ordinary people living ordinary lives. 
Our nation’s capital—where deals are cut and scandals are our 
way of life. A place where America’s brightest and most powerful 
politicians gather to argue for change for all citizens. Where 
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lobbyists and activists bang heads and shout their causes, shoulder 
to shoulder with radicals, liberals, and conservatives. In many ways, 
I had changed over those four years being involved in the anti-
Amendment 2 fight. I recalled the early days of my activism. Flush 
in the center of a radical 1960s activist organization, marching 
against the Vietnam War on behalf of my brother who was on the 
front lines, my commitment then closely mirrored my dedication of 
today. Richer, fuller idealism now came to me in ways I could never 
have foreseen. I had matured and my skills were more diplomatic 
and refined. By whatever means. Malcolm X’s words recalled images 
of the Black Panthers, many of whom were still imprisoned for 
their political beliefs. Others melted into the mainstream, their 
hair now gray and their children grown. The once angry activists 
were now applying their political talents to meetings with corporate 
managers in high-rise offices. 
After our small group of attorneys, activists, and plaintiffs had 
arrived and been seated for lunch, we shared our viewpoints and 
feelings. We laughed and cried together; the ad hoc luncheon gave 
everyone a chance to unwind and release the emotions of the tense 
hour they had silently spent in the courtroom. Light-hearted jokes 
blended with serious discussion about the implications of the 
morning’s presentation. Everyone seemed to avoid talking about 
what the final decision would be and when it would be given. 
“That’s Justice Powell,” Jean called out to us. 
“Who?” Frank Brown, CLIP director, asked. 
“What’s everybody talking about?” 
“Who?” someone repeated. 
“Former Supreme Court Justice Powell,” Jean explained, 
pointing casually across the room. Sitting with what appeared to be 
two colleagues was an elderly man dressed in a dark suit and tie. 
“He’s one of the Supreme Court Justices who sat on the bench 
when the 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick96 case was decided.” 
“You mean Georgia’s sodomy case?!” another asked. 
“That’s the one,” I said, shaking my head. “He voted for it.” 
“I heard somewhere that he made an about-face on that vote,” 
Jean interjected. “Powell said that if he had to do it all over again, 
he would have voted against Bowers. You know it’s never too late 
for someone to change . . .” 
 
 96.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
33
Celeste: Oyez, Oyez: An Inside Look at Romer v. Evans
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
2015] AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS 77 
Justice Powell was appointed by President Eisenhower in 1956, 
and was considered a liberal when he sat on the High Court bench. 
In October of 1990, three years after his retirement, Powell told a 
group of New York University law students, “I think I probably 
made a mistake in that one.”97 Besides Bowers, the only other 
change he would have liked to have made was to add the Equal 
Rights Amendment to the Constitution.98 
The politics surrounding the Bowers case were filled with irony. 
The case was brought by the Georgia Attorney General’s Office. 
The attorney representing Georgia was Michael Bowers. In 1997, 
the skeletons in Michael Bowers’ closet would begin to surface. 
That year, as a leading gubernatorial candidate for Georgia, Bowers 
admitted to an adulterous ten-year affair.99 Resigning his position as 
the state’s attorney general on June 1, 1997, Bowers, a married 
father of three children, broke his own promise to uphold the 
law.100 Never clearly disclosing when the affair ended, his news-
making tryst again brought attention to Georgia law. Adultery, like 
sodomy, was illegal in the southern state. Bowers would ultimately 
be overturned by Lawrence v. Texas101 in 2003, which cited the Romer 
case.102 
For now, the other attorneys, activists, supporters, and I were 
content with the day we had just endured. Life suddenly looked a 
little different, a little more hopeful. The continued fight for civil 
rights for gays and lesbians could now wait—at least until the 
following day. 
Before departing Washington, D.C., I visited the Gay and 
Lesbian Victory Fund. Upon entering their offices, Kathleen 
Debold, the political director of the organization, pulled me 
quickly into her office. 
 
 97.  Gay & Lesbian Archives of the Pac. Nw., Bowers v. Hardwick, SODOMY L., 
http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/bowers/bowers.htm (last updated Apr. 18, 
2007). 
 98.  See Edward Lazarus, The Ghost of Justice Powell: How His Cautious 
Conservatism Still Haunts the Supreme Court, FINDLAW (July 10, 2003), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030710.html. 
 99.  Kevin Sack, Georgia Candidate for Governor Admits Adultery and Resigns 
Commission in Guard, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at A, available at 1997 WLNR 
4879916. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 102.  Id. at 560. 
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“Mary,” Kathleen whispered. “You understand we are going to 
lose this thing. The Justices are not going to decide in our favor.” 
“Who told you that?!” I asked. 
“That’s the word here in Washington, D.C., Mary,” Kathleen 
responded. The LGBT law professors and national organizations 
apparently all thought that we had a loser case. 
“Well, the word is wrong,” I said matter-of-factly. “We are going 
to win and we’re going to do so on the rational basis argument. I 
am confident that the Justices will decide in our favor. In fact, I’m 
sure the vote will be 6–3 in our favor! We have a just cause here, 
Kathleen!” 
The Supreme Court opinion on the Romer case was indeed 6–3 
on a rational basis theory. Amen. I participated in a rally with over 
4000 in attendance on the steps of the Colorado State Capitol 
Building on the day of the Supreme Court decision. I said, “How 
does it feel to know that the Constitution is alive and well and living 
in Colorado?” While I was speaking to the audience, a filmmaker 
captured me and this comment was used in the documentary film, 
After Stonewall.103 I then said, “It ain’t over till the fat lady sings,” and 
proceeded to sing “God Bless America.” The crowd roared with 
laughter. 
The language and dicta authored by Justice Kennedy would be 
argued and quoted in many LGBT cases over the next fifteen years. 
He wrote: “[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable 
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity 
toward the class of persons affected.”104 This language was cited in 
the oral arguments and briefs for the 2013 United States Supreme 
Court cases on DOMA105 and California Proposition 8,106 as well as 
in the new round of marriage cases before the federal appeals 
courts.  
Once the marriage issue is totally resolved, I believe that the 
Romer language will be used in cases concerning religious freedom. 
Business owners may have a harder time espousing a religious 
 
 103.  AFTER STONEWALL (First Run Features 1999). This film was the second in 
a two-part series that depicted and documented the Gay Rights Movement in the 
U.S., from its inception, to the Romer case and beyond, to the beginnings of the 
gay marriage movement. Id. Part I included the Mattachine Society and the 
Daughters of Bilitis, and Part II included the Stonewall Riots and Romer. Id. 
 104.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
 105.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 106.  See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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belief argument to deny LGBTs a public accommodation when it 
stands in stark contrast to people who take those positions solely 
because of their “animosity toward a class of persons.” 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to forbid 
laws that reflect “animus” against gay and lesbian Americans, and 
last year’s decision in United States v. Windsor reaffirmed this anti-
animus principle.107 Given the motives of those who support the 
expansion of religious exemptions, it is not difficult to construct an 
argument that the new laws would deny equal protection under the 
law. The Romer case, in my opinion, will go down in the annals of 
LGBT history as the LGBT Brown v. Board of Education.108 I am 
grateful to have been involved in the case. 
 
 
 107.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 108.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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